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[L.A. No. 28821. In Bank. Apr. 18, 1967.] 
R. D. REEDER LATHING CO., INC., Plaintiff and Re-
spondent, v. FRANCIS E. ALLEN, JR., Defendant and 
Appellant. 
[la,lb] Mechanics' Liens-Personal Judgment-Against Owner.-
In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the part of the 
judgment holding defendant-owner personally liable to plain-
tiff-lathing contractor was clearly erroneous where, though the 
complaint stated that plaintiff performed its work at defend-
ant's request, it appeared from plaintiff's own affidavits in 
support of a motion for summary judgment that the request 
came, not from defendant directly, but from his prime con-
tractor. 
[2] Id.-Personal Judgment-Against Owner.-The right to en-
force a mechanic's lien against realty does not give rise to the 
owners personal liability in the absence of a contract between 
the lien claimant and the property owner. 
[3] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Opposing Affidavits.-In 
considering a summary judgment motion, the trial court must 
determine whether the party opposing the i motion has pre-
sented, by affidavit, llny facts that give rise to a triable issue. 
[4] Id.-Summa.ry Judgments-Issue to be Determined by Trial 
Oourt.-O. a motion for summary judgment, the court does 
not resolve conflicting factual allegations; the purpose of sum-
mary judgment procedure is to discover whether the parties 
have evidence requiring assessment at a trial. 
[5] Id.-Summary Judgments-Procedure.-Summary judgment 
procedure is drastic and should be used with caution so that 
the procedure does not become a substitute for trial. 
[6] Id.-Summary Judgments-Affidavits-Oonstruction.-On a 
motion for summary judgment, the moving party's affidavits 
[1] Estoppel of mechanic's lien claimant as predicable on his 
representations to owner as to payment made to claimant by con-
tractor or subcontractor, note, 155 A.L.R. 350. See also Oal.Jur.2d, 
Mechanics' Liens, § 166. 
licK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Mechanics' Liens, § 230; [3] 
Judgments, § 8a(9) (a); [4] Judgments, § 8a(10) (e); [5] Judg-
ments, § 8a(6); [6] Judgments, §§ 8a(8) (d), 8a(9) (d); [7] Judg-
ments, § 8a(10) (f); [8, 9] Mechanics' Liens, § 155; [10] Mechan-
ics' Liens, §§ 150, 155; [11] Estoppel, § 28; [12] Mechanics' Liens, 
§ 8; [13, 16] Judgments, § 8a (5)( d); Mechanics' Liens, § 198; 
[14] Judgments, § 8a (7); [15] Mechanics' Liens, §§ 63, 155; [17] 
Judgments, § 8a(9) (e). 
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are strictly construed; those of his opponent, even if in con· 
clusionary terms, are liberally construed. 
[7] ld.-Summary Judgments-When Motion Properly Granted.-
Summary judgment is proper only where the moving party's 
affidavits suffice to sustain a judgment in his favor and his 
opponent does not, by affidavit, show facts sufficient to present 
a triable issue. 
[8] Mechanics' Liens-Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Estoppel may be 
invoked against a liening materialman when, to induce pay. 
ment from the owner, the materialman gives the contractor a 
lien waiver, a false receipt of payment, or a promise to look 
only to the contractor for his money. 
[9] ld.-Estoppel to Claim Lien.-A materialman's failure, after 
giving the contractor a receipt for payment of materials fur· 
nished, to inform the owner that the contractor's checks given 
in payment were dishonored gives rise to an estoppel to claim 
a lien. 
[10] ld.-Waiver: Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Waiver of or estoppel 
to assert mechanic's lien rights does not require a formal con-
tract, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the 
parties' conduct. 
[11] Estoppel-Equitable Estoppel-Silence.-In an action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien, plaintiff corporation, a lathing con-
tractor familiar with the contracting business, had a duty 
to speak and its silence supported an inference of guile where 
it was alleged that plaintiff and the prime contractor had a 
secret contract pursuant to which plaintiff extended credit to 
the prime contractor in exchange for all the lathing work and 
agreed to furnish labor lien releases, signed in blank, or to 
permit the prime contractor to prepare its own labor releases 
and that defendant-owner was relying on the lien releases 
supplied by the prime contractor in authorizing payment. 
[12] Mechanics' Liens-Theory and Construction of Lien Law.-
Though the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is 
to protect those who perform labor or furnish material toward 
the improvement of another's property, inherent in this con· 
cept is a recognition also of the rights of the owner of the 
benefited property. 
[13] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judg· 
ment: Mechanics' Liens-lssues.-In an action to foreclose a 
lathing contractor's mechanic's lien, whether the notation "RE-
LEASE FROM LATHER MUST ACCOMPANY," which appeared at the 
bottom of the voucher the owner used to authorize payments 
from his construction lender, indicated the owner knew a lath-
ing contractor was involved and that the owner was not igno. 
rant of the prime contractor's failure to pay the lathing con-
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tractor presented a question of fact; and the owner was 
entitled to have a trier of fact answer the question of what he 
understood by the notation on the voucher. 
[14] Id.-Summary Judgments-Motion.-The office of a motion 
for summary judgment is merely to ferret out fact issues, not 
to resolve them. 
[15] Mecha.nics' Liens-Bonds: Estoppel to Claim Lien.-Though 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1185.1, subd. (d), permits an owner the 
precaution of requiring his contractor to take a bond to cover 
defaults of those with whom he contracts, the statute does not 
make it mandatory for the owner to require a bond from the 
contractor, and the owner's right to demand a bond does not 
preclude equitable estoppel of a lien claimant when the owner 
fails to demand a bond. 
[16] Judgments-Summary Judgments-Issues Precluding Judg-
ment: Mechanics' Liens-Issues.-On plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, 
whether defendant-owner was reasonable in not requiring the 
prime contractor to take out a bond or whether the owner's 
failure to do so precluded his invoking estoppel against the 
lien claimant was a question defendant was entitled to have 
tried. 
[17] Id. - Summary Judgments-Opposing Affida.vits-Sufficiency 
-Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, and where there is 
any showing of a triable issue, the motion should not he 
granted; it should not be granted merely because opposing 
affidavits were borrowed from a different case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Steven S. Weisman, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. Summary judgment 
for plaintiff reversed. 
George Magit and Richard A. Perkins for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Mantalica, Barclay & Teegarden and Lewis C. Teegarden 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a summary 
judgment for plaintiff in an action to foreclose a mechanic '8 
lien. The judgment decreed that defendant was personally 
liable to plaintiff for the value of the labor and materials it 
supplied and impressed the improved property with mechan-
ic 's liens. 
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[130] The part of the judgment that defendant is person-
ally liable to plaintiff is clearly erroneous. [2] In the ab-
sence of a contract between a lien claimant and the property 
owner, the right to enforce a mechanic's lien against real 
property does not give rise to personal liability of the owner. 
(Golden Gate Bldg. Materials 00. v. Fireman (1928) 205 Cal. 
174, 177-178 [270 P. 214] ; Roberts v. Security Trust & Sav. 
Bank (1925) 196 Cal. 557, 573-584 [238 P. 673].) [lb] Al-
though the complaint states that plaintiff performed its work 
at the request of defendant, it appears from plaintiff's own 
affidavits that the request came, not from defendant directly, 
but from his prime contractor. 
The complaint alleged that plaintiff supplied lathing ma-
terials and performed labor, for which it had not been paid, 
in the construction of houses on 18 separate lots owned by 
defendan.t. In an amended answer defendant denied that 
plaintiff had performed the work alleged and set up affirma-
tive defenses of waiver and estoppel. 
Plaintiff then filed its motion for summary jUdgment (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 437c) , supported by the affidavit and 'declaration 
of its president, Robert D. Reeder, and the declaration of 
Robert M. Thomas, a materialman. Defendant filed counter-
affidavits. 
[3] In considering a motion for summ.ary judgment the 
trial court must determine whether the defendant has by affi. 
davit presented any facts that give rise to a triable i~ue. 
(Stationers Oorp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 
412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785] ; Eagle Oil & Refin-
,ing 00. v. Prentice (1942) 19 Cal.2d 553, 555 [122 P.2d 264].) 
[4] The cour~ does not resolve conflicting factual allega-
tions, for the purpose of the procedure is to discover. whether 
the parties have evidence requiring assessment at a trial. 
[5] Such summary procedure is drastic and should be 
used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for 
trial. (Towne Development 00. v. Lee (1965) 63 Cal.2d 147, 
148 [45 Cal.Rptr. 316, 403 P.2d 724] ; Stationers Oorp. v. Dun 
& Bradstreet, Inc., supra; Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
715, 725-726 [299 P.2d 257]; Ooyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 
Cal.2d 257, 260-261 [223 P.2d 244] ; Eagle Oil & Refining 00. 
v. Prentice, supra, at p. 556.) [6] Accordingly, the affi-
davits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of 
his opponent, even if in conclusionary terms, are liberally 
construed. [7] Summary judgment is proper only if the 
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affidavits in support of the moving party are sufficient to sus-
tain a judgment in his favor and his opponent does not by 
affidavit show facts sufficient to present a triable issue. 
Examination of the affidavits in this case shows that plain-
tiff has established for purposes of its motion that it per-
formed the claimed work on defendant's houses and that it 
has not been paid. It did the work pursuant to a contract with 
the prime contractor for the lathing and plastering, West 
Valley Plastering, Inc., which is now bankrupt. The critical 
issue is whether plaintiff has waived its lien or is estopped to 
a.ssert it. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff conspired with West Val-
ley to keep defendant ignorant of plaintiff's contribution to 
the construction so that defendant would be unable to protect 
himself against plaintiff's potential lien. According to defend-
ant's affidavits, toward the end of 1962 West Valley was ex-
periencing difficulty getting finances to carry on its business. 
In disregard of West Valley's weak financial condition and 
relying for security primarily on its access to lien rights, 
plaintiff offered West Valley extended credit in exchange for 
West Valley's agreement to subcontract all its lathing work 
to plaintiff. West Valley agreed to those terms and also that 
plaintiff "would either furnish WEST VALLEY with labor lien 
releases signed in blank, or permit WEST V ALLEY to prepare 
its own labor releases, which WEST VALLEY could then in turn 
complete as progress payments became due from buildings 
and owners, thereby permitting WEST V ALLEY to receive its 
money when due. In this connection, [plaintiff] would provide 
WEST VALLEY with a list of all lathers employed by [plain-
tiff] so that West Valley, in turn, could type in the names of 
said lathers for the purpose of completing the labor lien re-
leases. . . ." Defendant makes further allegations from 
which a trier of fact might infer that Thomas Building Sup-
ply Co., which was the only materialman on the job to whose 
existence defendant had been alerted, was aiding plaintiff in 
carrying West Valley on the shaky credit basis by providing 
the materials that plaintiff supplied defendant. A trier of fact 
might also infer that plaintiff had a financial interest in 
Thomas Building Supply Co., which was later reorganized 
into Deering Building Co. by the president of plaintiff and 
the president of Thomas Building Supply Co. 
Thus, defendant seeks to prove a scheme whereby plaintiff 
extended imprudent credit without bearing the risk itself but 
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counting on the lien law to leave the risk on the unsuspecting 
and innocent property owner. To further the scheme, plaintiff 
and West Valley had to conceal plaintiff's existence and iden-
tity from defendant, else he would demand a lien waiver from 
plaintiff before paying West Valley, thus destroying either 
plaintiff's secret security or West Valley's advantageous 
credit arrangement. In support of his allegations defendant 
filed affidavits by himself and his attorney and declarations by 
Addis Johnston and Raymond J. Croteau, formerly the presi-
dent and vice-president of West Valley. The Johnston and 
Croteau declarations had been prepared for use in a different 
lawsuit. After the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, defendant moved for reconsideration and 
supplied declarations of Johnston and Croteau prepared spe-
cifically for the ease at bench, setting out substantially the 
same facts as their other declarations. Defendant's motion 
was denied. 
These affidavits raise triable issues of fact in regard to es-
toppel. [8] Estoppel may be invoked against a Hening 
materialman when he gives the contractor a waiver of lien, a 
false receipt of payment, or a promise to look only to the 
contractor for his money, to induce payment from the owner. 
(E.g.,·E~ K. ·Wood Lumber Co. v. Higgins (1960) 54 Cal.2d 
91, 94 [4 Cal.Rptr. 523, 351 P.2d 795]; Ware Supply Cf>. V.I 
Sacramento Savings &- Loan Assn. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d' 
398, 408-409 [54 Cal.Rptr. 674] ; J. &; W. C. Shull v. Doerr 
(1930) 110 Cal.App. 613, 615-616 [294 P. 464].) [9] After 
giving the contractor a receipt for payment a materialman's 
failure to inform the owner that the contractor's checks to 
him were dishonored also gives rise to an estoppel. (Jaekle 
v. Halton (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 706 [78 P.2d 441].) 
[10] "Waiver -of [or estoppel to assert] mechanic's lien 
rights does not require a formal contract, but may be inferred 
from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties." (E. 
Ie lVood Lumber Co. v. Higgins, supra, at p. 94; see also 
flooclwin Tile &- Brick Co. v. DeVries (1944) 234 Iowa 566, 
369 [3 N.W.2d 310, 155 A.IJ.R. 346] ; Detroit Graphite Cf>. v. 
Carncy (1935) 175 Okla. 583 [53 P.2d 584, 586].) 
[11] Given the ulh'gl,a secret contract between plain-
tiff and "\Vcst Valley, plaintiff's familiarity with the con-
tracting business and its alleged knowledge that defendant 
was relying on lien releases supplied by West Valley in 
authorizing payments, plaintiff had a duty to speak, and its 
silence supports an inference of guile. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
) 
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§ 1962, subd. 3, now EYid. Code, § 623; California Lettuce 
Growers, Inc. Y. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 483 
[289 P.2d 785, 49 A.L.R.2d 496] ; People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 
Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 406, 421 [196 P.2d 570, 6 A.L.R.2d 
1179] ; American Bldg. etc. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. (1932) 
214 Cal. 608, 617-618 [7 P.2d 305]; Bruce v. Jefferson Union 
High School Dist. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 632, 634 [26 Cal. 
Rptr. 762] ; Dettamanti v. Lompoc Union School Dist. (1956) 
143 Cal.App.2d 715, 721 [300 P.2d 78] ; Balestreiri v. Arques 
(1942) 49 CaI.App.2d 664, 669 [122 P.2d 277] ; Merry v. Gar-
ibaldi (1941)48 Cal.App.2d 397, 401, 403 [119 P.2d 768].) 
[12] '" While the essential purpose of the mechanics' lien 
statutes is to protect those who have performed labor or fur-
nished material towards the improvement of the property of 
another [citation], inherent in this concept is a recognition 
also of the rights of the owner of the benefited property. It 
has been stated that the lien laws are for the protection of 
property owners as well as lien claimants .... ' " (Borchers 
Bros. v. Buckeye Incubator Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 234, 239 [28 
Cal.Rptr. 697, 379 P.2d 1] [quoting from Alta Bldg. Material 
·Co. v. Cameron (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 299, 303 [20 Cal.Uptr. 
713]] ; William If. Birch & Co. v. Magic :l'r·ansit Co. (1903) 
139 Cal. 496,498-499 [73 P. 238].) 
[13] The only fact to which plaintiff points to contradict 
defendant's allegations of inequitable suppression of informa-
tion is relevant, not to plaintiff's role in setting the trap for 
defendant, but to the reasonableness of defendant's reliance 
on the nonexistence of the facts plaintiff conspired to conceal. 
At the bottom of one of the vouchers defendant used to au-
thorize payments from his construction lender appears the 
notation "RELEASE FROM LATHER MUST ACCOMPANY." Plain-
tiff contends that this notation indicates that defendant knew 
that a lathing contractor was involved and that he was there-
fore not ignorant of the true facts. Defendant replies, with 
dictionary and technical citations, l that a lather is a work-
man, not a contractor, and tllat lien releases from all workmen 
did accompany the vouchers. Plaintiff's contention presents a 
question of fact. What defendant understood by the notation 
lWebster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.); 1 Dictionary of 
Occupation Titles (3d ed. 1965) Lather, Code No. 842,781, Division of 
Manpower Administration, Bureau of Employment Security, U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor; Directory of National and International Labor Unions in 
the United States, 1965, Bull. No. 149, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
380 R. D. REEDER LATHING CO. V. ALLEN [66 C.2d 
on the voucher is a question defendant is entitled to have 
answered by a trier of fact. [14] The office of a motion for 
summary judgment is merely to ferret out fact issues, not to 
resolve them. (Stationers Corp. v. Dun &- Bradstreet, Inc., 
supra, 62 C,a1.2d 412, 417; Eagle Oil ill Refining 00. v. Pren-
tice, supra, 19 Cal.2d 553, 555.) 
[15] Plaintiff contends that defendant could have pro-
tected himself against potential liens that would force him to 
pay twice for the same work or suffer the loss of his property 
by requiring the contractor to take out a bond to co~r the 
defaults of those with whom he contracts. This precaution is 
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 1185.1, subdivi-
sion (d). The statute does not make it mandatory for the 
owner to require a bond from the contractor, however, and we 
find no basis for holding that the owner's right to demand a 
bond precludes an equitable estoppel when he does not do so. 
Several factors discourage the home builder from demanding 
a bond of his contractor (see Barnard, Limitation of Owner's 
Liability for Mechanics' Liens (1964) 16 Hastings L.J. 179, 
184; Comment (1964) 16 Hastings L.J. 198, 199), and there is 
some evidence-including the fact that the same bankruptcy 
by the contractor that precipitated this case also resulted in at 
least i40ther suits to foreclose liens-that it is the general 
practice in the industry for the owner to forego requiring a 
bond. (See Gaulden & Dent,More on Mechanics Liens, Stop 
Notices and the Like (1966) 54 Cal.L.Rev. 179, 204-205; Hear-
ing of the Senate Interim Judiciary Committee, August 20-21, 
1956, at 112-114, cited in Comment (1963) 51 Cal.L.Rev. 
331, 356, fn. 194; Third Progress Report to the Legislature by 
Senate Interim .Judiciary Committee, 1955, pp. 85, 87-88.) 
[16] Whether defendant was reasonable in not requiring 
West Valley to take out a bond or whether his failure to do so 
should preclude him from invoking estoppel is another ques-
tion defendant is entitled to have tried. 
Plaintiff contends, finally, that we cannot consider the 
.Johnston and Croteau declarations since they were filed in a 
different case. 'Ve find no authority on using affidavits filed in 
another action. [17] Since summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy and should not be granted if there is any showing 
of a triable issue, it should not be granted merely because 
opposition affidavits were borrowed from a different case. Such 
affidavits are as persuasive of the existence of evidence 
that could be produced as affidavits of the same potential 
witnesses specifically prepared for the case at bench. More-
'.~ 
over, defendant produced such affidavits in support of a mo-
tion for reconsideration, and it was an abuse of discretion for 
the court to deny that motion. 
The judgment is reversed. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
~nd Sullivan, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 17, 
1967. 
